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Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data

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Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data

Rebecca Lipman*

Abstract

Consumers constantly enter into blind bargains online. We trade our personal information for free websites and apps, without knowing exactly what will be done with our data. There is nominally a notice and choice regime in place via lengthy privacy policies. However, virtually no one reads them. In this ill-informed environment, companies can gather and exploit as much data as technologically possible, with very few legal boundaries. The consequences for consumers are often far-removed from their actions, or entirely invisible to them. Americans deserve a rigorous notice and choice regime. Such a regime would allow consumers to make informed decisions and regain some measure of control over their personal information. This article explores the problems with the current marketplace for our digital data, and it explains how we could make a robust notice and choice regime work for consumers.

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INTRODUCTION

When you go online or use an app on your phone, you are sharing your information with multiple companies at once.¹ For example, if you tell the dating website OkCupid that you occasionally drink or do illegal drugs, not only will OkCupid save that information to your profile, but marketers can also buy that information in real time.² If you search for something on the Center for Disease Control's website, say, "herpes symptoms," then the CDC will tell Google about your search.³ The CDC is not trying to profit from you, but they use Google Analytics to measure their website traffic. The CDC uses Google Analytics because it is an effective free tool.⁴ It is a "free" tool because it is quietly paid for with your data.⁵

There are programs that can show you which third parties are watching you on a given website.⁶ They can even block many of these third parties,⁷ although blocking them may disrupt the appearance or usability of some sites.⁸ But these programs cannot tell you what those third parties will do with your information.⁹ They also cannot tell you what inferences these companies might make about you.¹⁰ For example,

1. Robert L. Mitchell, *Ad Tracking: Is Anything Being Done?*, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 2, 2014), <http://www.computerworld.com/article/2489106/data-privacy/ad-tracking—is-anything-being-done-.html>.

2. Daniel Zwerdling, *Your Digital Trail: Private Company Access*, NPR (Oct. 1, 2013), <http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/10/01/227776072/your-digital-trail-private-company-access>.

3. Brian Merchant, *Looking Up Symptoms Online? These Companies Are Tracking You*, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 23, 2015), <http://motherboard.vice.com/read/looking-up-symptoms-online-these-companies-are-collecting-your-data>.

4. *Id.*

5. *Id.*

6. See, e.g., GHOSTERY, <https://www.ghostery.com/en/features>.

7. See *id.* But Ghostery itself may actually track you too, if you let it. Tom Simonite, *A Popular Ad Blocker Also Helps the Ad Industry*, MIT TECH. REV. (June 17, 2013), <http://www.technologyreview.com/news/516156/a-popular-ad-blocker-also-helps-the-ad-industry/>. Ghostery and similar programs can also be thwarted. See, e.g., Frans Rosén & Linus Särud, *Chrome Extensions – AKA Total Absence of Privacy*, DETECTIFY LABS (Nov. 19, 2015), <http://labs.detectify.com/post/133528218381/chrome-extensions-aka-total-absence-of-privacy>.

8. See Andrew Coutts, *Privacy Plug-in Showdown: Do Not Track Plus vs. Ghostery*, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 15, 2012), <http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/do-not-track-plus-vs-ghostery/>.

9. See *Privacy Badger FAQ*, PRIVACY BADGER, <https://www.eff.org/privacybadger> (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).

10. See *id.*

in order to send them relevant coupons, Target famously created an algorithm to determine which female customers might be pregnant.¹¹ Women did not need to buy baby clothes for Target to know they were pregnant—it was subtler cues like buying zinc, lotion, and a purse large enough to double as a diaper bag.¹² Target was aware that it could make women “queasy” by suddenly sending them ads for maternity clothes, so it instead started to insert baby-related ads among those for unrelated products to make the placement look random.¹³ “As long as we don’t spook her,” a Target executive said, “it works.”¹⁴

Many Americans feel spooked.¹⁵ Our data seems to be more widely disseminated and more vulnerable than ever. Hackers gained access to millions of Americans’ accounts at JP Morgan and Anthem Health Insurance.¹⁶ The NSA collected millions of Americans’ phone records for years.¹⁷ Commercial data brokers buy and sell our data to such an extent that one broker has 3,000 data points for nearly every single U.S. consumer.¹⁸

11. Charles Duhigg, *How Companies Learn Your Secrets*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=1&r=1&hp>.

12. *Id.*

13. *Id.*

14. *Id.*

15. Anne Flaherty, Associated Press, *Americans Growing More Concerned Over Their Online Privacy: Study*, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/05/online-privacy-study_n_3870670.html (“50 percent of Internet users saying they are worried about the information available about them online, up from 33 percent in 2009.”).

16. Supriya Kurane, *JPMorgan Data Breach Entry Point Identified*: NYT, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2014), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/23/us-jpmorgan-cybersecurity-idUSKBN0K105R20141223>; Elizabeth Weise, *Millions of Anthem Customers Alerted to Hack*, USA TODAY (Feb. 5, 2015), <http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/02/05/anthem-health-care-computer-security-breach/22917635/>.

17. The USA Freedom Act mandated that the NSA’s bulk collection end on November 29, 2015. Ellen Nakashima, *With Court Approval, NSA Resumes Bulk Collection of Phone Data*, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/with-court-approval-nsa-resumes-bulk-collection-of-phone-data/2015/06/30/a40c5a64-1f3f-11e5-bf41-c23f5d3facel_story.html. The NSA is not the only agency that had been in the habit of collecting Americans’ telephone records in bulk. The DEA kept records of virtually all Americans’ international calls to as many as 116 countries from 1992 to 2013 with no court supervision whatsoever. The program stopped after the public backlash to the NSA’s similar program. John Ribeiro, *US Drug Enforcement Amassed Bulk Phone Records for Decades*, PCWORLD (Apr. 7, 2015), <http://www.pcwold.com/article/2907332/us-drug-enforcement-amassed-bulk-phone-records-for-decades.html>.

18. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 65 (2014), <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf>.

At least 30 percent of Americans have taken one or more steps to avoid surveillance since the Edward Snowden revelations.¹⁹ The remaining 70 percent have not taken steps either because they are not concerned, or simply do not know where to begin. The above scenarios—cyber attacks, government surveillance, and commercial data aggregation—are fundamentally different problems with different solutions. But it is easy for the disparate threads to merge together to become one amorphous fear, with no hint of how to secure our personal information.

This article seeks to take on just one of those threads—commercial use of individuals' data. Consumers enter into essentially blind bargains online, where they trade their personal information for free websites and apps. Despite the presence of a notice and choice regime, virtually no consumers read the relevant privacy policies.²⁰ Some consumers think just having a privacy policy means a website will keep their information private.²¹ In this environment, companies can gather and exploit as much data as technologically possible, with very few legal boundaries. The consequences for consumers are often invisible to them. Consumers deserve a more rigorous form of notice and choice that allows them to make informed decisions and regain some measure of control over their personal information online.

Part I of this article will explore why the current system of buying and selling individuals' digital data is problematic. Part II will describe the various laws and agencies that are active in this area of privacy law. Lastly, Part III will propose a new, mandatory notice and choice regime to empower individuals and to pressure companies to take greater responsibility for what they do with their customers' data. Part IV will briefly conclude.

I. WHAT'S WRONG WITH "CREEPY?"

Third party advertisers—"third" parties because they are present in addition to both (1) you and (2) the website you are visiting—can often foster "creepy" outcomes. Just three years ago it was considered

19. Jason Hahn, *Pew: 22% of Americans Have Changed Email, Social Media, Cell Phone Use Post-Snowden*, DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 21, 2015), <http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/pew-22-of-americans-have-changed-email-social-media-cell-phone-use-post-snowden-nsa/>. Other studies have previously shown the number of Americans who have tried at least one method of hiding their online activity is as high as 86 percent. Flaherty, *supra* note 15.

20. James Temple, *Why Privacy Policies Don't Work – And What Might*, SFGATE (Jan. 29, 2012), <http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Why-privacy-policies-don-t-work-and-what-might-2786252.php>.

21. *Id.*

newsworthy to report that, if you searched for an item on Google, Facebook would show you ads for that same item the next day.²² One young journalist described this experience as “creepy.”²³ Today, the experience is commonplace.²⁴ Many users may still be creeped out, but others are pleased to receive ads that are relevant to them.²⁵

These relevant ads are made possible by the extensive profiles built by data brokers. Data brokers collect vast amounts of information about consumers, such as their race, sex, education level, politics, buying habits, and social security numbers.²⁶ Consumers are then classified according to their age, socioeconomic status, political leanings, or even religious affiliations.²⁷ These classifications, while useful to advertisers trying to reach specific consumers, can also shade into discrimination. A data broker-created category containing high numbers of low-income minorities might be targeted with high-interest payday loans.²⁸ The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) posits that a category like “Biker Enthusiasts” could be useful for advertisers wanting to sell motorcycles, but the category could also be used by an insurance company looking for signs of risky behavior.²⁹

22. Walter Hickey, *I Just Realized How Zealously Facebook Tracks Me And Sells That Info To Advertisers*, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2013), <http://www.businessinsider.com/i-didnt-know-facebook-tracked-me-2013-4>.

23. *Id.*

24. See A.E.S., *How Online Advertisers Read Your Mind*, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21, 2014), <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/09/economist-explains-12>.

25. A 2012 Pew Poll found that 28 percent of Americans, particularly younger Americans, did not mind targeted advertising because it provided them with more relevant ads. *Internet Users Don't Like Targeted Ads*, Pew Research Center (Mar. 13, 2012), <http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/internet-users-dont-like-targeted-ads/>.

26. See Natasha Singer, *Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome*, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html>.

27. *Companies Tracking Our Online Footsteps Should Be More Transparent, Says FTC*, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 13, 2014), <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/companies-tracking-online-footsteps-transparent-says-ftc/>.

28. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, *FTC Recommends Congress Require the Data Broker Industry to be More Transparent and Give Consumers Greater Control Over Their Personal Information* (May 27, 2014), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-require-data-broker-industry-be-more> [hereinafter Press Release, *FTC Recommends Congress Regulate Data Brokers*]; Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Big Data and Consumer Trust: Progress and Continuing Challenges*, Remarks Before the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (Oct. 15, 2014), in FED. TRADE COMM'N COMMENT, 2014 WL 5319633, at *3.

29. Press Release, *FTC Recommends Congress Regulate Data Brokers*, *supra* note 28.

Additionally, the data brokers' profiles usually contain mistakes. One of the largest brokers admitted that "up to 30% of a person's profile . . . may be wrong at any given time."³⁰ These mistakes, of which consumers are almost inevitably unaware, can have real consequences. One data broker named Spokeo paid \$800,000 to settle FTC charges that it marketed its profiles as an employment screening tool, when it had failed to ensure that its profiles were accurate.³¹ It is not hard to imagine a job applicant being passed over because a broker incorrectly reported his education level, or managed to paint an unflattering picture through various other inaccurate pieces of personal information.³²

The profiles data brokers provide could readily facilitate illegal discrimination. The brokers themselves, however, are essentially unregulated and operate with what the FTC calls "a fundamental lack of transparency."³³ So while a job applicant who believes she encountered a racist interviewer in person can sue under anti-discrimination laws, that same applicant will likely have no inkling that she was discriminated against because of her (possibly incorrect) Spokeo profile.³⁴ The data brokers enable employers and others to discriminate, or at the very least get uncomfortably close to ethical gray areas, by offering vast amounts of personal information that were not previously readily available.

We are hardly the first generation to have struggled with the effects of new, privacy-reducing technologies. Justice Louis Brandeis was disturbed by the proliferation of gossip columns, and in particular, the

30. Melanie Hicken, *Find Out What Big Data Knows About You (It May Be Very Wrong)*, CNN MONEY (Sept. 5, 2013), <http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/pf/axiom-consumer-data/>.

31. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Spokeo to Pay \$800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FRCA (June 12, 2012), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/06/spokeo-pay-800000-settle-ftc-charges-company-allegedly-marketed> [hereinafter Press Release, Spokeo to Pay \$800,000].

32. One plaintiff alleged that Spokeo hurt his employment prospects by incorrectly listing "his employment status, marital status, age, educational background, number of children, 'economic health,' and 'wealth level.'" Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, *Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.*, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 11-56843), 2012 WL 2132528, at *11. The Ninth Circuit did not decide if the prospective harm to Robins' employment status was enough to support standing, because the court found that he had standing under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. *Robins v. Spokeo*, 742 F.3d 409, 413-14 (9th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court granted cert and heard argument this past November. The question presented was if Congress may confer Article III standing on a plaintiff "who suffers no concrete harm." *Spokeo v. Robins*, SCOTUSBLOG, <http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/spokeo-inc-v-robins/>.

33. DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, *supra* note 18, at vii.

34. Even if she were aware of her profile, she may not have standing or the ability to show a harm to her employment prospects. See *Robins*, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3.

advances in “instantaneous photograph[y]” in 1890.³⁵ He wrote an article called “The Right to Privacy,” which provided the background principles for modern privacy law.³⁶ His worries feel outdated now, but at the time, the “unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons” was a real concern because a new technology had enabled wide circulation of portraits for the first time.³⁷ One generation’s technological crisis is another generation’s status quo. When Caller ID was first introduced, some felt it created serious privacy problems.³⁸ Some states even sought to regulate it.³⁹ Today, Caller ID is ubiquitous and an essential part of any cell phone’s functionality.⁴⁰

One difference between photographs, Caller ID, and our current situation is that photographs and Caller ID are visible to the consumer. Many of the technologies that invade our privacy today do so invisibly. Besides the data brokers and smaller third party trackers described in the introduction, various apps and items we purchase directly can also collect a surprising amount of personal information. You might not mind your Groupon app knowing your location so it can offer you deals for local businesses, but you might mind it checking your location every 20 minutes and selling your location to advertisers.⁴¹ You might be happy to buy a TV that can be voice-activated, but you might not realize that this TV will record all your conversations and send those conversations to third parties (albeit for apparently benign purposes).⁴² There is a wealth of new data being recorded from users, including sensitive (but

35. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, *The Right to Privacy*, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).

36. See generally *id.*

37. See *id.*

38. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, *A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social Norms*, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 59, 72–73 (2014).

39. *Id.*

40. Many people may not answer their phone if they do not recognize the number calling them. Moreover, try to imagine looking up a recent call, or finding an old voice mail, without each item helpfully labeled with the correct name or number.

41. Dozens of popular apps collect your location every three minutes, sharing your location information with advertisers 73 percent of the time. Mary Beth Quirk, *Study: Some Popular Android Apps Tracking User Location Once Every Three Minutes*, CONSUMERIST (Mar. 24, 2015), <http://consumerist.com/2015/03/24/study-some-popular-android-apps-tracking-user-location-once-every-three-minutes/>.

42. Samsung apparently uses a third party company to help comprehend your voice commands, but it does not say who that third party is, or if your voice data is encrypted or otherwise protected when it is transferred. Parmy Olson, *Samsung’s Smart TVs Share Living Room Conversations With Third Parties*, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2015), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2015/02/09/samsungs-smart-tv-data-sharing-nuance/>.

unprotected) health data.⁴³ However, the developing economy around individuals' data is largely invisible to us.

That is not to say that we are not active participants in this economy. Our data is purchased (for very small amounts, at the individual level),⁴⁴ and we are compensated for it. Services like Gmail, Google Calendar, and Facebook are only free because users' data empowers Google and Facebook to generate a lot of revenue from selling ads.⁴⁵ If they were barred from aggregating our data, they could no longer offer targeted ads, potentially seriously hurting their bottom lines, and their ability to offer services for free.⁴⁶ We have, in a sense, simply bargained our data away for free services.⁴⁷ But it is a bargain we accepted without any firm sense of what exactly we were giving up.

I do not wish to underplay the multifaceted value of many online services. Ben Wittes and Jodie Liu wrote an excellent article arguing that there are actually many privacy gains we receive from modern technologies, which are often unfairly dismissed as merely gains in convenience or efficiency.⁴⁸ Most people are grateful they can ask Google about their embarrassing medical symptoms instead of asking a

43. Health apps have greatly increased in popularity, but the information collected by them is not covered by HIPAA because the health information is generated by the user, not by a HIPAA-covered entity such as a hospital. Andrea Peterson, *Privacy Advocates Warn of 'Nightmare' Scenario as Tech Giants Consider Fitness Tracking*, WASH. POST (May 19, 2014), <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/19/privacy-advocates-warn-of-nightmare-scenario-as-tech-giants-consider-fitness-tracking/>.

44. Your location is only worth about \$0.0005, though your health information can go for \$0.26. Emily Steel, Callum Locke, Emily Cadman, & Ben Freese, *How Much is Your Personal Data Worth?*, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013), <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/927ca86e-d29b-11e2-88ed-00144feab7de.html#axzz3XPY8lowp>.

45. See Heather Kelly, *Why Gmail and Other E-mail Services Aren't Really Free*, CNN (Apr. 1, 2014), <http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/31/tech/web/gmail-privacy-problems/>; see also Rolfe Winkler & Jack Marshall, *Google May Offer New Way to Target Ads*, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2015), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-may-offer-new-way-to-target-ads-1429044389>.

46. See *After Success, More Spending on Mobile Local Ads*, EMARKETER (Apr. 17, 2014), <http://www.emarketer.com/Article/After-Success-More-Spending-on-Mobile-Local-Ads/1010763>; see also Steven Perlberg, *Targeted Ads? TV Can Do That Now Too*, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2014), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/targeted-ads-tv-can-do-that-now-too-1416506504>.

47. For an alternative perspective on the value of individuals' data, see JARON LANIER, *WHO OWNS THE FUTURE?* (2013). Lanier advocates for individuals being compensated for their data and other digital contributions via an attribution and micro-payments system. *Id.* at 19–21.

48. Benjamin Wittes & Jodie C. Liu, *The Privacy Paradox: The Privacy Benefits of Privacy Threats*, BROOKINGS INST. (May 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2015/05/21-privacy-paradox-wittes-liu/wittes-and-liu_privacy-paradox_v10.pdf.

friend or making a doctor's appointment. It is definitely a privacy gain to keep your medical concerns or pornography preferences away from people you know, even if the tradeoff is sharing that information with Google. However, by using examples like health information and pornography, Wittes and Liu primarily envision privacy as secrecy. But when Americans are aware of any type of surveillance, they often react negatively, whether it concerns their darkest secrets or their everyday behavior. For example, Google Glass was a flop in large part because people disliked the idea that they could be unknowingly filmed by anyone wearing Google Glass.⁴⁹ Even if the filming was in a public place, such as a bar or restaurant, people were upset by it.⁵⁰ People do not want their everyday interactions recorded. Therefore, the privacy gain of Google keeping our embarrassing secrets for us must be measured against the privacy loss of Google learning things that might not be secret *per se*, but that we do not want recorded on a daily basis.

We are fairly adept at protecting our privacy in the physical world. We know to lower our voices when having a private conversation in a public place. We often change our behavior when someone points a recording device at us, whether or not we were engaged in a "secret" activity at the time. But when we go online, these physical cues are absent. There is consequently an intuition gap between how private our online browsing feels, and how public it actually is.⁵¹ We may know intellectually that our activities are being recorded, but there is no physical trigger that warns us to watch what we do or say. At the same time, the consequences are arguably much greater. A stranger might eavesdrop on you in a restaurant, but the stranger does not know who you are and likely will not remember your conversation a day later. When a data broker or Google tracks your behavior online, that information is identified with you personally, and it will be saved for an unknown (and possibly indefinite) period of time.⁵² If users could

49. Alyssa Newcomb, *From 'Glassholes' to Privacy Issues: The Troubled Run of the First Edition of Google Glass*, ABC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2015), <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/glassholes-privacy-issues-troubled-run-edition-google-glass/story?id=28269049>.

50. See, e.g., Hillary Crosley Coker, *Entitled Creep Secretly Films People With Google Glass*, JEZEBEL (Feb. 28, 2014), <http://jezebel.com/entitled-creep-secretly-films-people-with-google-glass-1532859496>.

51. See M. Ryan Calo, *Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere)*, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1040 (2012) (discussing how "visceral" notice could be a boon to online privacy).

52. See Cecilia Kang, *Google Tracks Consumers' Online Activities Across Products, and Users Can't Opt Out*, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-tracks-consumers-across-products-users-cant-opt-out/2012/01/24/gIQAArgJHOQ_story.html.

intuitively understand how they were being monitored, they might take a much stronger approach to protecting their data.

Currently, it is not clear how strongly we should protect Americans' privacy online. There are privacy policies that alert users, albeit in opaque terms, that their data will be collected and shared. However, virtually no one reads these policies.⁵³ Americans provide inconsistent opinions about privacy in survey results.⁵⁴ One survey suggests that we tend to accept whatever data sharing is the status quo, but resist additional sharing, without any firm idea of what the status quo is.⁵⁵ On a more academic level, the federal Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board held a day-long public meeting in 2014 called "Defining Privacy."⁵⁶ Over a dozen panelists highlighted the many different ways people think about privacy.⁵⁷ If privacy experts cannot agree on a single definition of privacy, and if average Americans have inconsistent opinions about what they are comfortable sharing, how can we craft a coherent policy approach to address Americans' concerns about online privacy?

One important first step we can take is to better inform individuals about the invisible personal data marketplace. If users had access to clear, concise information about what data was being collected about them and what was being done with that data, the intuition gap between the physical world and the online could be greatly reduced. Americans might then speak with a more uniform voice about what practices they

53. If someone wanted to read all the privacy policies for the websites they visit in a year, it would take them about one month. Shankar Vedantam, *To Read All Those Web Privacy Policies, Just Take A Month Off Work*, NPR (Apr. 19, 2012), <http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/04/19/150905465/to-read-all-those-web-privacy-policies-just-take-a-month-off-work>.

54. See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsky, *supra* note 38, at 64 (discussing a study where approximately half of the respondents did not want companies being able to hear them complaining about the companies, unless the companies' goal was to improve their products, in which case listening in was fine).

55. A survey by Carnegie Mellon Professor Lorrie Faith Cranor and Stanford Professor Aleecia McDonald showed that "only 11 percent of Americans would . . . pay \$1 per month to withhold their data from their favorite news site. . . . [But] 69 percent of Americans [would not] accept a \$1 discount on their [monthly] Internet bills in exchange for allowing their data to be tracked." Alexis C. Madrigal, *How Much Is Your Data Worth? Mmm, Somewhere Between Half a Cent and \$1,200*, ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2012), <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/how-much-is-your-data-worth-mmm-somewhere-between-half-a-cent-and-1-200/254730/>.

56. See November 12: Public Meeting on "Defining Privacy", PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD. (Nov. 7, 2014), <https://www.pclob.gov/newsroom/20141020.html>.

57. See generally Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Bd., *Defining Privacy Forum* (Nov. 12, 2014) (transcript available at <https://www.pclob.gov/library/20141112-Transcript.pdf>).

are comfortable with. Dr. Lorrie Faith Cranor, a privacy expert at Carnegie Mellon University (and currently the FTC's Chief Technologist), conducted a study wherein consumers used a custom-built search engine to find products to buy online. Next to the links to websites selling the products, the search engine displayed a simple "privacy meter" that indicated how strong the privacy policy was for each website. A significant number of consumers chose to pay more for the products when they could buy them from more privacy-protective websites.⁵⁸ Therefore, this study suggests that effective privacy notices could make a real difference in changing consumers' behavior, and consequently, the privacy practices of individual companies.

Different privacy notice regimes have been tried previously, with mixed to mostly poor results. Part III will explore these previous attempts before suggesting how a new regime could actually benefit consumers. However, it is helpful to first examine what laws we currently have in place that can protect Americans' privacy online.

II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PRIVACY LAW

A. *Federal Statutes and the Fourth Amendment*

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures,⁵⁹ including warrantless searches of our digital data.⁶⁰ While the Fourth Amendment has significant implications for the interplay between government and the private companies that hold our data,⁶¹ the Fourth Amendment does not protect us from our voluntary interactions with private companies.

Congress has passed a number of sectoral statutes that protect discrete types of data that may be held by corporations. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) protects our credit information.⁶² The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects students' educational records.⁶³ The Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects our medical information.⁶⁴ These

58. Lorrie Faith Cranor, *Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy Notice and Choice*, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 292–93 (2012).

59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

60. See *Riley v. California*, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).

61. See Rebecca Lipman, *The Third Party Exception: Reshaping an Imperfect Doctrine for the Digital Age*, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 471 (2014).

62. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1681–1681x (2012).

63. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. §1232g (2012).

64. Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).

statutes cover limited types of information, in limited situations. The medical information your FitBit or Apple Watch collects is not covered by HIPAA because HIPAA only covers certain entities like hospitals or health insurance companies, not user-generated health information.⁶⁵ New educational apps record how long students spend watching tutorials, how they do on quizzes, and how long it takes them to do their homework online.⁶⁶ But none of this information, or the consequential inferences educational companies can make about a child's intelligence or interests, is protected by FERPA because the apps' data does not constitute a protected "education record."⁶⁷ Congress will hopefully close some of these holes, but statutory reform is painfully slow compared to how quickly technology moves forward.

Our system is significantly different from Europe's approach. The European Union ("EU") has pursued an omnibus approach, where data is protected regardless of the type of entity holding the data or the exact type of data at issue.⁶⁸ This more comprehensive view of a "right to privacy" affects how companies view their obligations to their customers. For its UK website, the giant data broker Acxiom has a privacy policy page that begins with "Acxiom Ltd respects the right of individuals to privacy."⁶⁹ The equivalent U.S. webpage begins with "Acxiom respects the privacy of every individual about whom we either process information or maintain information within Acxiom's information products."⁷⁰ Besides being much more legalistic and difficult to read, the U.S. version does not contemplate any individual "right" to privacy, and it mirrors the U.S. sectoral approach by carefully defining whose privacy it will respect. These differences in approach can result in real impacts on consumers.⁷¹ However, the EU has

65. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(4)(iv) (2015). See also Peterson, *supra* note 43.

66. Stephanie Simon, *Student Privacy Pledged; Critics Scoff*, POLITICO (Oct. 7, 2014), <http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/student-privacy-tech-companies-111645.html>.

67. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4).

68. Paul M. Schwartz, *The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures*, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1975 (2013).

69. *UK Privacy Policy*, ACXIOM, <http://www.acxiom.com/about-acxiom/privacy/uk-privacy-policy/> (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).

70. *US Products Privacy Policy*, ACXIOM, <http://www.acxiom.com/About-Acxiom/Privacy/US-Products-Full-Privacy-Policy/> (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).

71. For example, a European court held that individuals have a broad "right to be forgotten" that they can utilize to force Google to take down certain negative (though truthful) search results. No comparable right exists for Americans who are unhappy about their Google results. See Alistair Barr & Sam Schechner, *Google Advisory Group Recommends Limiting 'Right to Be Forgotten' to EU*, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2015), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-advisory-group-says-limit-right-to-be-forgotten-to-eu-1423206470>.

struggled to meaningfully engage consumers about online privacy.⁷² The EU's recent attempt at creating a notice and choice regime will be discussed below in Part III.

B. Agency Actions in Privacy Law

Despite our lack of omnibus privacy laws, the FTC and Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") have taken steps to regulate data privacy more broadly. The FTC has shown a significant interest in privacy through reports on facial recognition technology, privacy disclosures in apps, and privacy issues in apps aimed at children.⁷³ They have also studied health apps, specifically looking at what data those apps are sharing with other companies.⁷⁴ In 2014, they released a long report on data brokers, focusing on nine brokers in an attempt to shed some light on the industry as a whole.⁷⁵ The name of the report is telling: "Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability."⁷⁶ The FTC can only *call for* transparency and accountability, they cannot mandate it without supporting legislation. The press release for the report highlights this fact by providing a long list of policies the FTC "encourages" Congress to consider enacting.⁷⁷

The FTC, however, has been making the most of the statutory authority it does have to protect consumers' privacy. The FTC has authority from § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices."⁷⁸ This allows them to pursue both companies that are blatantly trying to scam people, and companies whose practices fall into more of a gray area.⁷⁹ For example, the FTC entered

72. See Nicole Kobie, *Why the Cookies Law Wasn't Fully Baked – and How to Avoid Being Tracked Online*, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2015), www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/19/cookies-how-to-avoid-being-tracked-online.

73. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, *The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy*, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 626 (2014).

74. Kate Kaye, *FTC: Fitness Apps Can Help You Shed Calories – and Privacy*, ADVERT. AGE (May 7, 2014), <http://adage.com/article/privacy-and-regulation/ftc-signals-focus-health-fitness-data-privacy/293080/>.

75. Press Release, FTC Recommends Congress Regulate Data Brokers, *supra* note 28.

76. DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, *supra* note 18.

77. Press Release, FTC Recommends Congress Regulate Data Brokers, *supra* note 28.

78. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).

79. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf.

into a consent decree with the app Snapchat, which promised users they could send messages that would disappear instantly after reading. It turned out that there were relatively simple workarounds that allowed people to secretly save messages, and the FTC got Snapchat to agree to 20 years of monitoring to make sure they do not deceive customers with false promises in the future.⁸⁰ The FTC was able to get a similar consent decree from Facebook when it broke numerous promises it had made to users in its privacy policies.⁸¹

While § 5's "unfair or deceptive" language is powerful, these situations require the FTC to catch companies in a lie. A company could simply be vague about its commitment to privacy, or have a very broad privacy policy and count on nobody reading it, and § 5 would not apply. For example, the company Groupon was relatively open about the fact that it was going to widely share its users' data (including their location) so the FTC could not take action against them for doing so.⁸² Conversely, the FTC was able to go after a popular flashlight app that sold location data because that app actively deceived users by giving them a fake option to opt out of such tracking.⁸³ If users do not do their homework on what information their apps are collecting about them, and the app makers are not foolish enough to outright lie about what they are doing, the FTC's ability to control how companies share our data is very limited.

In addition to using § 5 to protect consumer privacy, the FTC has also used its § 5 authority to address data security. It has forced multiple companies into settlements where the companies "put consumers' personal data at unreasonable risk."⁸⁴ This is a relatively novel use of § 5, and the FTC has been challenged on their ability to mandate how companies protect user data from hackers. When Wyndham Hotels and Resorts suffered a data breach, the FTC brought an action against them,

80. Brett Molina, *Snapchat Settles Privacy Complaint with FTC*, USA TODAY (May 8, 2014), <http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/05/08/snapchat-ftc/8853239/>.

81. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep>.

82. David Magee, *Groupon's New Privacy Policy Goes Too Far: Selling Out Users*, International Business Times (July 11, 2011), <http://www.ibtimes.com/groupons-new-privacy-policy-goes-too-far-selling-out-users-297525>.

83. Cecilia Kang, *Flashlight App Kept Users in the Dark About Sharing Location Data*, FTC, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/flashlight-app-kept-users-in-the-dark-about-sharing-location-data-ftc/2013/12/05/1be26fa6-5dc7-11e3-be07-006c776266ed_story.html.

84. See 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE, *supra* note 79.

and Wyndham moved to dismiss it.⁸⁵ Wyndham asserted that the FTC lacked the authority to pursue unfairness claims in the context of data security, and alternatively, even if they did have that authority, the FTC's data security actions violated fair notice principles because the FTC had not promulgated regulations saying what data security measures companies had to take.⁸⁶ The district court held in favor of the FTC,⁸⁷ Wyndham appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed, resulting in a major win for the FTC.⁸⁸

Although the FCC has not been as active on the privacy front, they have taken some steps to regulate data security. Recently, they entered a \$25 million settlement with AT&T after hundreds of thousands of customers had their accounts breached.⁸⁹ The FCC's statutory authority is limited to telecommunication carriers under § 222 of the Communications Act of 1934,⁹⁰ giving them far fewer companies to regulate than the FTC. Similar to the FTC, their authority in this area has also been questioned—by two of the FCC's own commissioners. Commissioner Pai has said that the FCC has never interpreted the Act to create an enforceable duty for companies to reasonably protect their users' personally identifiable information.⁹¹ Commissioner O'Rielly has said that he is "not convinced" the FCC has the authority to act in this area, even if companies generally have a responsibility to safeguard their customers' data.⁹² Both commissioners also raised fair notice concerns similar to those Wyndham raised against the FTC.⁹³ Given the questions surrounding the FTC's and FCC's authority to force companies to

85. See *FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014).

86. *Id.*

87. *Id.*

88. *FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). See also Paul Rosenzweig, *The FTC Takes Charge – FTC v. Wyndham*, LAWFARE (Aug. 26, 2015, 10:05 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/ftc-takes-charge-ftc-v-wyndham>.

89. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, AT&T To Pay \$25M To Settle Investigation Into Three Data Breaches (Apr. 8, 2015), <http://www.fcc.gov/document/att-pay-25m-settle-investigation-three-data-breaches-0>.

90. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).

91. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re TerraCom, Inc. and YourTel America, Inc. at 25, File No.: EB-TCD-13-00009175, (FCC Oct. 24, 2014) https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-173A1.pdf.

92. *Id.* at 27 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael O'Rielly).

93. *Id.* at 25 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pai); *id.* at 27 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner O'Rielly).

implement reasonable data security measures, it is unsurprising that there have been strong calls on Capitol Hill for data breach legislation.⁹⁴

In addition to § 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has authority to police privacy under two other statutes that bear mentioning. The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") gives the FTC enforcement authority over companies that provide consumer reports.⁹⁵ The FTC has used this authority to force settlements with companies like Spokeo and Instant Checkmate,⁹⁶ who do not advertise themselves as credit reporting agencies,⁹⁷ but do provide information that can amount to a credit "consumer report."⁹⁸ The FTC can bring charges under the FCRA when these companies fail to properly verify their information, fail to ensure that their information will only be used for legally permissible purposes, or fail to notify consumers about the information they are selling about them.⁹⁹ The FTC can also bring charges under the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act when companies collect children's personal information without their parents' consent.¹⁰⁰

Lastly, the FTC has power beyond enforcement actions. The FTC can issue guidelines, press releases, and the above-mentioned reports.¹⁰¹ These documents create a kind of "soft law," as the FTC does not clearly indicate what parts of its recommendations might be mandatory and what parts could just be considered "best practices."¹⁰² In particular, larger, more responsible companies will tend to obey even soft signals from the FTC to avoid the chance of facing an enforcement action.¹⁰³

The FTC has taken the lead on privacy through these different methods, but its ability to fully address digital privacy concerns is limited. The FTC is responsible for policing both anticompetitive behavior and unfair and deceptive practices in every industry.¹⁰⁴ The

94. See Cory Bennett, *Lawmakers See Momentum for Data Breach Legislation*, THE HILL (Jan. 27, 2015), <http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/230867-data-breach-bill-is-achievable-goal>.

95. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2012).

96. See Press Release, Spokeo to Pay \$800,000, *supra* note 31; 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE, *supra* note 79, at 6.

97. See *About Instant Checkmate*, <http://www.instantcheckmate.com/about/> (last visited Feb. 28, 2016); *About Spokeo*, <http://www.spokeo.com/about> (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).

98. See 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE, *supra* note 79, at 6; Press Release, Spokeo to Pay \$800,000, *supra* note 31.

99. Press Release, Spokeo to Pay \$800,000, *supra* note 31; 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE, *supra* note 79.

100. 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE, *supra* note 79, at 7–8.

101. Solove & Hartzog, *supra* note 73, at 625.

102. *Id.* at 626.

103. See *id.*

104. *About the FTC*, <http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc> (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).

agency may not have the bandwidth to also figure out how to extend their existing authorities to cover the abundance of new privacy problems. Moreover, the FTC's basic approach makes the most sense when the agency is policing the relationship between consumers and the companies with which they interact. When a third party aggregator collects information about an individual from various sources, there is no direct interaction where they could have "deceived" the consumer. It is also difficult to argue that data brokers acted "unfairly" when their business model is the established driver of online advertising. The FTC cannot even mandate privacy policies—that was done by state law, in the innovative state of California.

C. *California's Privacy Laws*

California has long been a leader in online privacy laws. Most websites have privacy policies due to California's Business and Professions Code § 22575, which requires that any website collecting personally identifiable information must "conspicuously post" a privacy policy on its website.¹⁰⁵ The law applies to any website that people in California might use, and therefore effectively requires privacy policies nationwide.¹⁰⁶ The law went into effect in 2004, and has since been amended to require that websites disclose both how they respond to "Do Not Track" signals, and if third party trackers may be present on the company's website.¹⁰⁷ A bill was proposed in 2013 that would have mandated that privacy policies be much simpler and shorter, but the bill died a year later.¹⁰⁸

California further forces disclosure through its "Shine the Light" law. Section 1798.83 of California's Civil Code requires companies to disclose if they sold a consumer's personal information for direct marketing, or alternatively, let a consumer opt out of the information sharing.¹⁰⁹ If the company chooses the disclosure route, it must disclose

105. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22575(a) (2014). Other states have since passed similar laws requiring privacy policies. *See, e.g.*, Delaware Online Privacy and Protection Act, S.B. 68, 148th Gen. Assemb., (Del. 2015).

106. *See* Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22575(a).

107. *See* A.B. 370, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (Consumers: internet privacy), *searchable at* LEGIS. COUNSEL'S DIG., <http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml>.

108. A.B. 242, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (Privacy: Internet), *searchable at* LEGIS. COUNSEL'S DIG., <http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml>.

109. *See* Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83(a) (2006); Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83(e)(6)(A) (2006); *California' S.B. 27, "Shine the Light" Law*, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., <https://epic.org/privacy/profiling/sb27.html>.

both the companies with which it shared the individual's information, and what information was shared.¹¹⁰ The law is limited, however, in how it defines "direct marketing purposes." Direct marketing only covers solicitations made to consumers via phone, mail, or e-mail.¹¹¹ It does not cover ads on websites and phones, or collection by data brokers.¹¹² Furthermore, the disclosures are only available to consumers upon request,¹¹³ and studies have shown that compliance with the law is spotty.¹¹⁴ A "Right to Know" Act proposed in 2013 sought to expand § 1798.83, but it died in January 2014.¹¹⁵ The expansion would have removed the "direct marketing" limitation, allowing consumers to find out all the different companies to which their information was being sold.¹¹⁶ The proposed act, however, still would have required consumers to file a request in order to find out exactly who the company was sharing their personal information with.¹¹⁷

California has also been the most aggressive in protecting children online. Section 22581 of their Business and Professions Code requires that websites and apps allow minors to take down content they previously posted.¹¹⁸ If a teenager posts an inappropriate photo on Facebook, and later realizes that it was a bad idea, the photo can be permanently deleted—but the law does not force third parties to remove content that has already been re-posted by someone else.¹¹⁹ In another area of children's privacy, California passed the Student Online Personal Information Protection Act in 2014.¹²⁰ The Act goes a long way towards regulating educational apps that track students' development.¹²¹ It prohibits targeted advertising, using students' data to build a profile about them for non-educational purposes, and selling or disclosing

110. *Id.*

111. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83(e)(2).

112. *See id.*

113. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83(a).

114. Robert J. Herrington, *Illuminating Calif.'s 'Shine the Light' Law*, LAW360, <http://www.law360.com/articles/299095/illuminating-calif-s-shine-the-light-law>.

115. A.B. 1291, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (Privacy: Right to Know Act of 2013: disclosure of a customer's personal information), *searchable at* LEG. COUNSEL'S DIG., <http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml>.

116. *Id.*

117. *Id.*

118. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22581(a)(1) (2014).

119. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22581(b)(2) (2014).

120. S.B. 1177, 2013–2014 Senate, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2014) (Privacy: students), *searchable at* LEG. COUNSEL'S DIG., <http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml>.

121. *See id.*

students' information.¹²² Similar bills have been discussed at the federal level, but Congress has yet to follow California's lead.¹²³

III. NOTICE AND CHOICE AS A SOLUTION

While all of the above laws and agency actions are helpful in addressing certain privacy concerns, they do relatively little to address the larger problem of individuals entering into blind bargains for their data and subsequently feeling insecure about their privacy. Consumers can be empowered by giving them effective, immediate notice of what a given company will do with their information. However, before exploring a new notice and choice regime, it is important to review the regimes that have previously been attempted, and analyze why they failed.

A. *Previous Attempts at Notice and Choice Solutions*

Europe has been concerned about data privacy for a long time. The EU adopted the Data Protection Directive in 1995, which established many rules for information privacy.¹²⁴ A directive, however, is not a law directly applicable to the various EU members. It is a mandate for the different EU members to pass their own laws consistent with the directive.¹²⁵ This results in a patchwork of protections that can lead to the original directive being watered down in practice. This watering down effect is apparent in the EU's attempt to notify users when websites collect their data via cookies. The EU passed additional privacy directives in 2002 and 2009 to specifically regulate the use of cookies.¹²⁶ The 2002 directive created an opt-out system for users to avoid cookies, and the 2009 directive ostensibly strengthened privacy protections by requiring users to opt-in before cookies could be placed on their computers.¹²⁷ This has resulted in many websites simply adding a small banner on the top of their homepage that says something like: "We use

122. *Id.*

123. The federal Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act was introduced in Congress at the end of April 2015. Natasha Singer, *Legislators Introduce Student Digital Privacy Bill*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), <http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/legislators-introduce-student-digital-privacy-bill/>.

124. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281).

125. Paul M. Schwartz, *supra* note 68, at 1971–72.

126. Eoin Carolan & M. Rosario Castillo-Mayen, *Why More User Control Does Not Mean More User Privacy: An Empirical (and Counter-Intuitive) Assessment of European E-Privacy Laws*, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 324, 336–38 (2015).

127. *Id.*

cookies to give you the best possible experience on our site. By continuing to use the site you agree to our use of cookies.”¹²⁸ This may be followed by a link that says “find out more,” which leads to an extensive privacy policy.¹²⁹ There is little reason to think this type of notice is much more effective than American websites that include links to their privacy policies at the top or bottom of their webpages.¹³⁰ Moreover, different European countries have different requirements for providing users with cookie notices,¹³¹ leading to a complex web of regulation for companies to navigate. At the same time, there has been little enforcement against non-complying websites,¹³² leading to a much weaker notice and choice regime than the privacy directives envisioned.

The most prominent previous attempt at a notice and choice regime in the United States was P3P, the Platform for Privacy Preferences. P3P was a standard created by the World Wide Web Consortium—the organization that sets many of the standards for the internet.¹³³ In the mid-1990s, people had already noticed the unintelligibility of many websites’ privacy policies, and there was a movement to simplify and

128. TESCO, www.tesco.com, (last visited Dec. 30, 2015) (website for a leading British grocery and general merchandise retailer).

129. *Id.*

130. One commenter notes that the cookie banners do not cause users to think about what cookies are or why they are used, making them ineffective for enhancing users’ knowledge or privacy. Nicole Kobie, *Why the Cookies Law Wasn’t Fully Baked – and How to Avoid Being Tracked Online*, *GUARDIAN* (Mar. 19, 2015), www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/19/cookies-how-to-avoid-being-tracked-online (quoting Greg Rouchotas, technical director at Civic UK). A British web software development firm created a humorous infographic explaining the ineffectiveness of the UK’s cookie laws, and celebrated their “death” in 2013. Oliver Emberton, *The Stupid Cookie Law is Dead at Last*, *SILKTIDE* (Jan. 31, 2013), <https://silktide.com/the-stupid-cookie-law-is-dead-at-last/>.

131. See generally BRISTOWS, STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 5.3 OF DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC (THE “EU COOKIE LAW”) (June 5, 2015), <http://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/NEWS%20-%20NEWSLETTERS/IP%20ICT/2015/European-Cookie-Law-Implementation-Survey-June-2015.pdf> (explaining how companies can comply with each country’s cookie laws). The report notes that many countries have provided no official guidance on how to comply with the laws. *Id.* at 63.

132. Saira Nayak, *EU Regulatory Update: Dutch Cookie Rules Enforced*, *TRUSTE BLOG* (Aug. 5, 2014), <http://www.truste.com/blog/2014/08/05/eu-regulation-update-dutch-cookie-rules-enforced/> (noting that Spain took the lead on cookie law enforcement by fining two companies in 2013, and the Dutch had pursued two cases since then); Jennifer Baker, *French Privacy Cops Snarl at Websites Over Crap EU Cookie Warnings*, *REGISTER* (July 2, 2015), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/07/02/cnil_tells_20_french_websites_stop_tracking_users/ (reporting that France warned but did not fine twenty non-complying websites).

133. ARI SCHWARTZ, *CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., LOOKING BACK AT P3P: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 1* (2009), https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/P3P_Retro_Final_0.pdf.

standardize the policies.¹³⁴ If the policies were standardized, they could be easily read by both humans and machines. This standardization and ease of comprehension would ideally lead to a person being able to set their privacy preferences just once in their browser, and then whenever the user visited a website that did not conform to their preferences, their browser would either block the site, or the user would be notified and she could choose to visit the site anyway.¹³⁵

P3P ran into many problems. The primary issue was that creating a binding machine-readable P3P privacy policy was not mandatory.¹³⁶ When Microsoft incorporated P3P into Internet Explorer, companies had to provide a P3P policy to get their cookies through to the user. However, there was no enforcement mechanism forcing companies to obey their own P3P policies (the FTC declined to get involved in enforcement here), and, even more egregiously, it turned out the policy could literally just say “Bogus Policy” and Internet Explorer would let the cookies through, since “Bogus Policy” was not on the browser’s list of policies to block.¹³⁷ P3P’s ineffectiveness led many to criticize it as a false attempt at self-regulation that merely served to put off actual regulation by Congress.¹³⁸ P3P was also criticized for being overly complex,¹³⁹ and it never gained a large amount of support from the public.

“Do Not Track” is a more recent effort at protecting users’ privacy online, and it also has a notice element to it. All major browsers now have an option where the user can ask the websites they visit not to track them.¹⁴⁰ The FTC announced support for the program back in 2010, but even then the agency noted that it could not unilaterally mandate such a system.¹⁴¹ As mentioned above in Part II, California passed a law requiring websites to disclose how they respond to these “Do Not Track”

134. *Id.* at 2.

135. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., *PRETTY POOR PRIVACY: AN ASSESSMENT OF P3P AND INTERNET PRIVACY* (2000), <https://epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html>.

136. *See id.*

137. Lorrie Faith Cranor, *Internet Explorer Privacy Protections Also Being Circumvented by Google, Facebook, and Many More*, TECHNOLOGY | ACADEMICS | POLICY (Feb. 18, 2012), <http://www.techpolicy.com/CranorInternetExplorerPrivacyProtectionsBeingCircumvented-by-Google.aspx>.

138. *See, e.g.*, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., *PRETTY POOR PRIVACY*, *supra* note 135.

139. ARI SCHWARTZ, *LOOKING BACK AT P3P*, *supra* note 133, at 8.

140. Thorin Klosowski, *Everywhere You Can Enable “Do Not Track”*, LIFEHACKER (Aug. 5, 2013), <http://lifehacker.com/everywhere-you-can-enable-do-not-track-1006138985>.

141. Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, *F.T.C. Backs Plan to Honor Privacy of Online Users*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2010), <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/business/media/02privacy.html>.

signals, so users can read websites' privacy policies to find out what companies do when they receive individuals' requests.¹⁴² More likely than not, the website does nothing. Major websites like Google and Facebook ignore "Do Not Track" requests.¹⁴³ They claim it is unclear what the users really want (users probably want some cookies to be placed, lest they have to sign in again every time they want to check their Facebook newsfeed,) and it is not always clear that the browser is expressing the user's true preference, since some browsers have "Do Not Track" set as the default.¹⁴⁴ While there have been some news stories about companies not honoring "Do Not Track,"¹⁴⁵ as with P3P, there has been no wave of public outcry over the loss of a potentially valuable privacy mechanism.

AdChoices is likely the least effective privacy-enhancing regime in effect today. In 2010, the Digital Advertising Alliance introduced a turquoise AdChoices triangle that could be placed in advertisements.¹⁴⁶ If users click the triangle, they are given the choice to opt out of behavioral tracking by many third parties.¹⁴⁷ Very few consumers, however, know what the triangle signifies or choose to click on it.¹⁴⁸ The system is also flawed in that AdChoices works based on an "opt-out" cookie which will be deleted if the user deletes their cookies at some point, and even if they do not delete the cookie, they may still end up being tracked.¹⁴⁹

142. See, e.g., *CNN Privacy Statement, How We Respond to Do Not Track Signals*, CNN (July 31, 2015), <http://www.cnn.com/privacy>.

143. Elise Ackerman, *Google and Facebook Ignore "Do Not Track" Requests, Claim They Confuse Consumers*, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/eliseackerman/2013/02/27/big-internet-companies-struggle-over-proper-response-to-consumers-do-not-track-requests/>.

144. *Id.*

145. See *id.*; Elizabeth Dwoskin, *Yahoo Won't Honor 'Do Not Track' Requests From Users*, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014), <http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/02/yahoo-wont-honor-do-not-track-requests-from-users/>.

146. Tanzina Vega, *For Online Privacy, Click Here*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/business/media/the-push-for-online-privacy-advertising.html>.

147. *Id.*

148. Lauren E. Willis, *Why Not Privacy by Default?*, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 127 (2014); see also Alina Tugend, *Key to Opting Out of Personalized Ads, Hidden in Plain View*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/business/media/key-to-opting-out-of-personalized-ads-hidden-in-plain-view.html?_r=0.

149. Cranor, *Necessary but Not Sufficient*, *supra* note 58, at 300–01.

B. Why Pursue A New Notice Regime?

The domestic regimes listed above share some common problems: companies' participation was not mandatory, public pressure was insufficient to force companies to participate, and the information provided to consumers was often unclear.

This is unfortunate, as notice has multiple benefits as a regulatory tool. First, if you can make your notice mechanism visible and easy to understand, you can empower consumers to make informed choices. In some cases, consumers may feel that they do not have much of a choice—if you want to be on a social network with your friends, you probably have to join Facebook. However, huge websites like Facebook will be constrained to an extent by media coverage of their privacy practices.¹⁵⁰ Lower profile websites like news outlets or travel search engines are relatively interchangeable, and therefore could be seriously affected by a mandatory notice and choice regime. Second, notice regimes discourage practices that are obviously objectionable from a privacy standpoint, because companies do not want to tell customers they engage in such practices. Even with the lengthy and opaque privacy notices currently in place, the FTC is able to catch companies who violate their own privacy policies.¹⁵¹ Companies write privacy policies that restrict their own actions because they want to reassure their customers that they do take some steps to protect their users' privacy.

Third, and most importantly, a notice regime can force companies to take more responsibility for what happens to individuals' data. California's law mandating privacy policies only requires that companies tell users the categories of personally identifiable information they collect, and the categories of companies with which they share that information.¹⁵² The law does not tell consumers *what happens to their data* once it is passed on to a third party. If a notice law mandated that companies inform consumers what *uses* their data will be put toward, then companies could be forced to vet the third parties with which they

150. Facebook has often been in the news because of its privacy practices, and often changed course when the public responded negatively. See Bobbie Johnson & Afua Hirsch, *Facebook Backtracks After Online Privacy Protest*, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2009), <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/feb/19/facebook-personal-data>; Reed Albergotti, *Facebook Changes Real-Name Policy After Uproar From Drag Queens*, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2014), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-changes-real-name-policy-after-uproar-from-drag-queens-1412223040>.

151. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin, *FTC Delivers Mixed Warning on Location-Tracking*, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2015), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-delivers-mixed-warning-on-location-tracking-1429820925>; Press Release, Facebook Settles FTC Charges, *supra* note 81.

152. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(b)(1) (2014).

share data. They would also need to make sure that the third parties were only using their customers' data for the uses specified in the company's privacy policy. Otherwise, the company would be subject to the same sort of enforcement action that the FTC now conducts against companies that break the promises in their privacy policies. Companies would in a sense be "trustees" for their customers' data:¹⁵³ they would be free to put people's personal information to a variety of commercial uses, as long as they take responsibility for what happens to it.¹⁵⁴ Third parties, like data brokers, would consequently be limited to selling individuals' information for only specific permitted purposes, instead of the current free-for-all.

In crafting the specifics of a notice and choice regime, it is important to consider the research that has been done on how privacy notices affect consumers. For example, if a website simply asks users what information they would like to share, users feel empowered and will actually share more information than in other scenarios where they are not given explicit control over sharing their information.¹⁵⁵ Consumers tend to narrowly focus on the act of sharing their data with one party, rather than thinking about who else might be able to access their data or what their data might be used for later.¹⁵⁶ This narrow focus is another consequence of the intuition gap between the physical and online worlds. In the physical world, if you tell a friend a sensitive piece of information, the worst likely outcome is that your friend proves untrustworthy, and shares your sensitive information with other mutual

153. For an interesting discussion of creating a trustee model to prevent "data abuse," see Benjamin Wittes & Wells C. Bennett, *Database and a Trusteeship Model of Consumer Protection in the Big Data Era*, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/06/04-data-abuse-privacy-wittes-bennett/wittes-and-bennett_database.pdf.

154. The 1995 Data Protection Directive ostensibly gives Europeans the right to know who is receiving their data and what their data is being used for, however, the right announced in the Directive has not led to the kind of robust enforcement that the FTC is capable of. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, *Privacy on the Books and on the Ground*, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 309–10 (2011) (comparing the FTC's "entrepreneurial use of its enforcement power" with the relatively weak European enforcement agencies, and noting the surprising lack of initiative shown by European privacy advocacy organizations in utilizing the Directive's protections). See also EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES 5, 6 (2010), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/815-Data-protection_en.pdf (noting that in many EU countries, prosecutions for violations of the data protection laws are limited or non-existent).

155. Carolan & Castillo-Mayen, *supra* note 126, at 326.

156. Laura Brandimarte et al., *Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox*, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 340 341–42 (2012).

friends. Therefore, it makes sense to focus on the moment you share your information with your friend—that is the one moment you can control, and the privacy risks are obvious and tied to that moment. Sharing your information online, however, contains hidden privacy risks, which are tied to unknown individuals accessing your information later. When you share sensitive information online, the worst outcome could be that countless corporations you are unaware of later buy and sell your information and possibly even discriminate against you because of it. This is a far worse outcome than the average consumer is intuitively aware of when sharing information online. A new notice and choice regime must focus on closing this intuition gap, so that consumers will be encouraged to exercise control over how other companies may access and use their data in the future.

Instead of a notice and choice regime, some commentators might advocate for outright prohibitions on certain practices, or prefer an opt-in only regime for tracking.¹⁵⁷ There are areas where we do not allow consumers to make certain choices because the government makes a policy judgment that the harm is just too great. For example, you cannot buy very cheap but slightly rancid meat in a supermarket. The government will not allow you to make that bargain. There are arguably bargains that people should not be able to make with their data. A data bargain may be egregiously bad (i.e. a cookie I can never delete in exchange for reading a single news article), or we may wish to protect the wide swaths of people who would ignore even an incredibly well-designed notice regime to consistently make mediocre bargains for their data.

I would personally like to see certain data practices outlawed. For example, I do not think companies should be able to use purchasing data to make medical assessments about their customers, such as Target using algorithms to figure out which of their customers are pregnant.¹⁵⁸ I also do not think a website that deliberately solicits self-incriminating legal information (such as OkCupid asking if you do illegal drugs)¹⁵⁹ should be able to share that information with any third parties. However, these are my own personal policy preferences. I have no way of knowing if a poor young pregnant woman who could really use some coupons for baby clothes would mind terribly that Target analyzed her data to determine she was pregnant. As noted in Part I, individuals are quite

157. Timothy J. Van Hal, *Taming the Golden Goose: Private Companies, Consumer Geolocation Data, and the Need for A Class Action Regime for Privacy Protection*, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 713, 734–35 (2013).

158. Duhigg, *supra* note 11.

159. Zwerdling, *supra* note 2.

inconsistent in how they respond to surveys about privacy.¹⁶⁰ Because current data practices are so opaque to consumers, we have no way of knowing what trade-offs they might be willing to make. Nearly costless actions like turning on the “Do Not Track” signal or occasionally deleting cookies do not tell us how consumers would react to options that both actually stopped tracking and have real costs.

One final benefit to a notice and choice regime is that it can provide companies and policy makers with data points on how much consumers really value privacy. In Dr. Cranor’s experiment where consumers could see how protective online sellers were of their privacy before they bought an item, individuals changed their behavior based on the privacy notices.¹⁶¹ Rather than a lengthy privacy notice tucked away on a website, her experiment gave users notice right in their search engine, in an easy-to-comprehend privacy meter next to the seller’s links.¹⁶² There were four boxes, and if the boxes were all green, the site was very protective of privacy.¹⁶³ If they were all white, the site was not at all protective of the user’s privacy.¹⁶⁴ An effective notice regime like that, which successfully gives consumers an immediate sense of how a website treats their data, produces useable data about how much more consumers will pay for privacy. Once we acquire such data on a large scale, we can intelligently craft policies where some uses of personal information may be prohibited or strictly regulated.

C. *The Outlines of a Mandatory Notice and Choice Regime*

The Obama Administration has proposed a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights that would give consumers notice about what information a website or app collects about them, and what they do with that information.¹⁶⁵ However, this proposal has been attacked by privacy advocates and the head of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection for being full of loopholes and allowing companies to police themselves.¹⁶⁶

160. See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsky, *supra* note 38, at 64.

161. Cranor, *Necessary but Not Sufficient*, *supra* note 58, at 292–93.

162. LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. CYLAB, UNDERSTANDING USERS 6 (June 2014), <https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/newsevents/events/fopnac/pdfs/cranor-slides.pdf>.

163. *Id.* at 6.

164. *Id.*

165. ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT OF 2015, 6, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf>.

166. Elizabeth Dwoskin, *Consumer Protection Official Blasts White House Privacy Proposal*, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2015), <http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/03/09/federal-consumer-protection-official-blasts-white-house-privacy-proposal/>.

To overcome the shortcomings of the previous notice regimes, a new regime must be mandatory, strictly enforced by the FTC, and provide clear information to consumers. The first step is for Congress to pass a statute that requires all companies that collect consumer data via the internet (be it a website, app, or part of the “internet of things”¹⁶⁷) to publish a privacy policy. Going beyond California’s law, regulatory authority must be given to the FTC to craft a uniform machine-readable policy for all companies to use.¹⁶⁸ Policies need to detail what data the company collects, what the company uses individuals’ personal information for, and any third party uses of customers’ data. Companies that violate their own policies, intentionally or unintentionally (by sharing data with an unreliable third party), must be subject to enforcement actions. A negligence standard should be put in place where if a company vetted a third party, contracted to share data with them for a certain purpose, and the third party violated the agreement by using the data for another purpose, then the FTC would have to pursue that third party. However, if a company agreed to share data under a vague contract, or with a fly-by-night third party who was obviously not a legitimate business, the primary company would be on the hook for the violation.

In designing a uniform privacy policy, simplicity is vital. Consumers cannot be expected to spend time reading detailed policies. They need an easy way to comprehend and compare policies. Dr. Cranor has come up with an excellent model for privacy notices: nutrition labels.¹⁶⁹ A graphic is available in the previous footnote, but the format is essentially a grid with “information we collect” along the vertical axis, and “ways we use your information” along the horizontal axis. Each box in the grid represents a particular type of data, and a particular use of that

167. More and more household appliances are connected to the internet for convenient remote control, energy efficiency, and numerous other purposes. See *In the Privacy of Your Own Home*, CONSUMER REPORTS (Apr. 30, 2015), <http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2015/06/connected-devices-and-privacy/index.htm>. For any item that collects your data and transmits it outside your home, the item’s privacy policy could be published on its packaging, with emails sent to the consumer if the policy changes at a later date.

168. There is a potential First Amendment issue here, but the government is at minimum able to compel commercial speech when it is purely factual and uncontroversial, and appropriate to prevent deception. *Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio*, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Privacy notices arguably fall under “preventing deception,” but the D.C. Circuit also has held that other substantial interests besides combatting deception could also justify compelled commercial speech. *Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014). I believe protecting Americans’ personally identifiable information is clearly a substantial government interest.

169. CRANOR, UNDERSTANDING USERS, *supra* note 162, at 7.

data, such as “contact information” for “marketing purposes.” Categories under “information we collect” include “demographic information” and “health information.” Categories under “ways we use your information” include “provide service and maintain site” and “profiling.” The precise categories could be tweaked and designed to provide more detailed information when the user hovers over or clicks on each category. Each box may be red, to indicate that the company collects and uses your information for a given purpose, or white to indicate they do not.

After the “ways we use your information” categories, Dr. Cranor has an additional section called “Information sharing” that I would title “ways other companies can use your information.” Such categories could include specific uses such as “targeted advertising” and “background checks.” The categories should be worded in a way that is not negatively slanted,¹⁷⁰ but also makes clear exactly what may be done with your data. The number of categories would need to be limited to ensure that the grid does not become impossible to take in at a glance. Even if the consumer does not read all of the category names, however, they would still be able to get a general sense of the site’s privacy policy by immediately noticing if the grid is predominantly red or white. Since every website and app would have the same grid, consumers would become faster at reading the grid if they looked up different private policies over time.

In most instances, consumers would not even need to view the privacy grid. By having a mandatory machine-readable policy, the system could work the way P3P was meant to: with the user inputting their privacy preferences into their browsers one time, and their browsers then looking at the policy for every site.¹⁷¹ With every website forced to participate and fill out the same grid, there would not be the same loopholes there were with P3P, where companies were able to provide bogus policies. Users could simply fill in their own grids, and choose to only visit sites that match their preferences. There is, however, a question of what the browser should do when the user tries to visit a site that does not match their privacy settings. The browser could be set to either block the site entirely, or to provide a pop-up to warn users what

170. It would be a First Amendment problem to compel commercial speech that is not “purely factual.” See *Zauderer* 471 U.S. at 651.

171. For apps, users could set their preferences in their smart phones, and the phone could read the privacy policy of any app they buy. For the “internet of things,” consumers would need to glance themselves at the privacy grid on the item’s packaging, which should be a lesser burden considering the relative infrequency of buying new appliances vs. buying new apps or visiting new websites.

aspect of their privacy settings the site does not adhere to and let them click “OK” to visit the site anyway. For many webpages, the pop-up could also offer the user one or two alternative webpages that are very similar to the one the user was planning to visit. If I am searching for some news item on Google, it is rare that I see a link and think “this is the single article that covers the news story I was searching for.” One search result is often as good as another, and users may not mind going to a different page with a single click.

There is also no reason users should have to set their own detailed privacy preferences if they do not wish to do so. Browsers could offer simple “low,” “medium,” and “high” privacy settings, or trusted organizations like the ACLU could sponsor plug-ins that choose certain settings for the user based on what data uses the ACLU believes are the most harmful.

If consumers are dissatisfied with the number of pop-up warnings they are getting, they could obviously choose a less-stringent privacy setting, but they could also opt to receive notice at an earlier stage in the process. Google could offer a plug-in that shows a website’s privacy rating right next to the search result, as in Dr. Cranor’s custom search engine. That way individuals could select a relatively privacy-friendly result at the outset, rather than risk dealing with a pop-up.

IV. CONCLUSION

Americans should not have to settle for “creepy” or unfair privacy practices. We should not have to feel perpetually uneasy about what our personal information is being used for. The above notice and choice regime significantly empowers consumers. If we force companies to disclose precisely what they do, and what they enable third parties to do with their customers’ data, they will engage in more privacy-protective practices to avoid “spooking” their customers. Journalists will report on major companies whose grids are a sea of red. Consumers will change companies’ behavior by reacting to what the privacy grids reveal. Exposure works: when Instagram announced it was changing its terms of service in such a way that enabled it to sell users’ photos, there was a massive outcry and Instagram had to hastily reverse itself.¹⁷² Consumers

172. Craig Timberg, *Instagram Outrage Reveals a Powerful But Unaware Web Community*, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/instagram-outrage-reveals-a-powerful-but-unaware-web-community/2012/12/21/b387e828-4b7a-11e2-b709-667035ff9029_story.html.

have the power to change the way companies handle their data. They just need to know about it first.